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EX PARTE PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY: THE REAL VICE
OF PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS
JOSEPH M. HASSETr*
The recent trend toward more frequent imposition of criminal penalties
for violations of the federal revenue and securities laws has generated a
rash of litigation defining the proper relationship between civil and crimi-
nal investigations of the same subject matter. The questions presented by
such cases are the inexorable consequences of a system that accords sub-
poena power to administrative agencies for civil law enforcement purposes,
but assigns the grand jury an exclusive role in the criminal process.'
A violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) gives
rise to both civil and criminal penalties. 2 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has statutory authority to conduct investigations to
determine whether the laws it administers are being violated,3 and has the
power to compel testimony and the production of documents in the course
of such investigations.' The SEC may bring a civil enforcement action to
restrain conduct that violates the securities laws.' Nevertheless, the fifth
amendment provides that only a grand jury may institute a felony prosecu-
tion for violation of federal law. Thus, although the SEC may recommend
* Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.
See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); text accompanying notes
79-88 infra. This article discusses the proper relationship between civil administrative investi-
gations and criminal investigations of the same conduct in the context of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures. Both agencies
enforce statutes that have civil and criminal implications. See text accompanying notes 2-9
infra.
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) §§ 21(d), 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78ff (1976).
3 Section 21(a) of the '34 Act provides in part:
The [SEC] may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary
to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate
any provision of this chapter [or] the rules or regulations thereunder ....
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976).
For the purpose of an investigation authorized by § 21(a) of the '34 Act, see note 3
supra, the SEC, its members and its designated officers may:
administer oaths and affirmations, subpena [sic] witnesses, compel their atten-
dance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, correspond-
ence, memoranda, or other records which the [SEC] deems relevant or material
to the inquiry.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976).
1 SEC civil enforcement actions are brought as injunctive proceedings pursuant to §
21(d) of the '34 Act, which also authorizes the SEC to
transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as
may constitute a violation of any provision of [the '34 Act] or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the
necessary criminal proceedings under [the '34 Act].
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
' "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
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to the Attorney General that criminal proceedings be instituted,7 the De-
partment of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over such proceedings.8 Sim-
ilarly, responsibility for enforcement of the federal tax laws is split between
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Justice., These
divisions of responsibility result in simultaneous or "parallel" civil and
criminal investigations of the same conduct, and present difficult ques-
tions as to the proper relationship between the two investigations.
One of the most hotly litigated issues in the context of these parallel
investigations concerns the propriety of using agency employees as assist-
ants to a United States Attorney to aid in preparing a case or presenting
it to a grand jury. The bitterness of the dissenter's language in In re April
1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General Motors Corp. v. United States) ° and
the frequency with which the issue is being faced by circuit and district
courts," are sure signs of the conviction with which divergent viewpoints
on this issue are espoused.
The issue presented to the Sixth Circuit by the General Motors case is
but one aspect of the broader question of the extent to which the
"separateness" of parallel civil and criminal investigations of the same
conduct must be maintained. The underlying question is whether informa-
tion developed by the use of compulsory process 2 in a criminal investiga-
tion may be used for civil enforcement purposes, and vice versa. Instances
of such exchanges of information in addition to that considered in the
General Motors case include, for example, the use of information devel-
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976); see note 5 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(e) (1976).
Internal Revenue Code § 7602 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate
to require persons to produce documents and give testimony under oath. Under I.R.C. § 7401,
the Secretary or his delegate must authorize the institution of a civil action to collect taxes,
and the Attorney General or his delegate must direct that the action be commenced. Criminal
actions for violation of the federal tax laws are commenced on the recommendation of Re-
gional Counsel and approved by the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. G. CROWLEY
& R. MANNING, CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD - REPRESENTING THE TAXPAYER BEFORE TRIAL 53-56 (1976).
10 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1277 (1978) (vacating on rehearing en
banc, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1978).
It See, e.g., In re Paul Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978); In re J.R. Simplot Co. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 (9th
Cir. 1976), withdrawn as moot on other grounds, 77-2 U.S.T.C. 119511 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., [Current I
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 97,172 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
,1 Although informal methods of obtaining evidence exist, the limitations on the govern-
ment's use of compulsory process suggested in this article do not apply to them. The Second
Circuit has described the differences between formal and informal SEC investigations. See
United States v. Fields, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,552 (2d Cir.
1978). Only the formal investigation involves "issuance of processes or compulsion of testi-
mony." Id. at 94,277. Moreover, informal investigative materials may be disclosed to the
United States Attorney without the SEC authorization required for disclosure of formal
investigative materials. Id. at 94,276-77; see note 5 supra.
EX PARTE PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
oped in the course of a grand jury investigation to assert a civil obligation
to pay taxes, and the conduct of an SEC administrative investigation
during the pendency of an indictment with respect to the same subject
matter.
Although the courts are being flooded with litigation challenging such
exchanges of information and assistance, there has been little effort to
develop a coherent framework within which these issues can be analyzed.
The traditional approach to this subject begins and ends with the proposi-
tion that the powers of a grand jury may not be used to develop evidence
to benefit a civil investigation because the extraordinary powers of the
grand jury are granted to it only for the purpose of investigating criminal
conduct. It is argued that the "massive intrusions on freedom and privacy"
occasioned by the exercise of such powers are not justified in a civil case.'3
The powers of the grand jury are, in fact, extraordinary. They signifi-
cantly exceed those accorded to administrative agencies in two fundamen-
tal respects. First, whereas witnesses being examined by the SEC and the
IRS normally are permitted to be advised by counsel,'4 the grand jury
witness is not permitted to have counsel with him in the grand jury room.'
5
Second, there is a much greater opportunity for judicial review of an ad-
ministrative subpoena than of a subpoena issued by a grand jury. Whereas
failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena is punishable as a contempt
of court, an agency subpoena is not self-enforcing. 6 The agency must bring
a civil proceeding seeking a judicial order of enforcement." The defendant
in such an action can assert defenses," seek discovery into the agency's
compliance with its own rules and its motivation for bringing the action,"
and obtain appellate review of an adverse determination."
"1 See In re J. R. Simplot Co., 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 (9th Cir. 1976),
withdrawn as moot on other grounds, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas., 9511 (9th Cir. 1977); Robert
Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1908 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United
States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Note, Administrative Agency Access to
Grand Jury Materials, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 162, 177-78 (1975). See generally Pickholz & Pick-
holz, Balancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime and Traditional Safeguards:
Administrative Agencies and Jury Secrecy, 36 WASH. & LEE LAw REv. 1027 (1979).
14 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 11.6(c)(1979).
11 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
Is Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g) (failure without adequate excuse to obey court's
subpoena may be deemed a contempt of court) with Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46
(1964) (I.R.C. § 7402(b), granting United States District Courts jurisdiction to compel, by
appropriate process, compliance with IRS summons, is the only manner in which Secretary
of Treasury may enforce its summonses).
" 375 U.S. at 445-46.
IS The subject of an SEC investigation can challenge the agency's subpoenas on the
ground tht the subpoena did not comply with the usual requirements such as specificity and
lack of undue burden. A subpoena also can be challenged on the ground that the SEC has
acted arbitrarily and beyond the scope of its authority in issuing the subpoena. Shasta
Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1964).
" United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316-17 (1978).
20 Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1964).
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Unquestionably, the subpoena power of the grand jury is significantly
greater than that of the administrative agency. However, there are three
objections to accepting the greater power of the grand jury subpoena as the
basis for a rationale against the exchange of information between parallel
civil and criminal investigattons. First, the notion that the "more intru-
sive" powers of the grand jury may not be used to benefit a civil investiga-
tion is more fiction than fact. As shown in detail below, the fruits of the
grand jury investigation are regularly used in civil cases. The only prohibi-
tion in reality has become one against the use of a grand jury for the sole
purpose of benefiting a civil case. So long as there is a hint of possible
criminal prosecution, the grand jury may gather evidence with a view
toward its ultimate use for civil purposes.
Second, the greater power of the grand jury subpoena is principally an
excess of power against the witness, not the target of the investigation.
From the point of view of the potential defendant, the differences between
the administrative and grand jury subpoenas are not as significant as the
enormous power that is common to both. This is the government's right
to use compulsory process to develop a case against the target in a proceed-
ing at which he is not allowed to be present or to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him.2' The potential defendant can be damaged every bit
as severely by an IRS or SEC investigation as by a grand jury inquiry.
Third, a rationale for separating parallel investigations that rests on the
greater strength of the grand jury subpoena provides no basis for prohibit-
ing the use of an administrative agency's civil powers to benefit a criminal
investigation. Nonetheless, the most recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ment in this area precludes just that.2 Thus, the logic of the traditional
rationale against civil and criminal investigations sharing information is
plainly incomplete.
Each of these three objections to the traditional theory is discussed
separately below. In each case there emerges a different principle that
ought to be taken into account in analyzing the proper relationship be-
tween parallel grand jury and administrative investigations. Finally, these
principles are applied to the problem considered in the General Motors
case.
This analysis demonstrates that the real unfairness to the potential
defendant derives not from the interchange of information between the two
parallel arms of the investigation. Rather, the basic unfairness of parallel
investigations stems from the underlying fact that the government is using
21 The government can use compulsory process to develop a case against a potential
defendant in two ways. Process can be addressed to the potential defendant or to third
parties. This article addresses only the government's use of compulsory process addressed to
third parties for purposes of developing a case against the potential defendant. The Supreme
Court has been faced with the separate question of overlapping civil and criminal subpoenas
addressed to the target of the investigation. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
1 United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); see text accompanying notes
79-87 infra.
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compulsory process to develop its case against the defendant at proceed-
ings from which he is excluded. This unfairness is common to both the
agency and grand jury arms of the investigation and would exist even if
there were no parallel investigations or interchanges of information be-
tween them. The fact of parallel investigations merely accentuates the
underlying unfairness.
There are three reasons why the unfairness is more readily perceived
in the case of parallel investigations of complex economic crimes than in
the case of the traditional grand jury investigations of crimes of violence.
First, the sheer magnitude of the investigative effort in complex economic
cases makes clear that the enterprise in which the government is engaged
has progressed far beyond the mere framing of charges against a defendant,
and has become a process from which the defendant ought not, in fairness,
be excluded. Second, the point at which the administrative agency sees fit
to recommend that particular criminal charges be lodged against an identi-
fied defendant provides a clear point of demarcation beyond which further
use of compulsory process to prove those charges ought to be confined to
proceedings at which the defendant is accorded the right of cross-
examination. Third, there is more likely to be significant related civil
litigation in the case of economic crime than in the case of crimes of
violence. As discussed in more detail below,23 transcripts of testimony
given in ex parte agency or grand jury investigations are used in various
ways in the related civil litigation. Since in the more civilized setting of
civil litigation ex parte discovery is not normally tolerated, introduction
of the fruits of agency or grand jury testimony there accentuates the under-
lying unfairness of gathering the testimony for that purpose. The sharp
contrast between the powers accorded to the government investigators and
the procedures normally applied in civil litigation punctures the myth that
the target of a government investigation is given every advantage. On the
contrary, it becomes clear that he is the victim of procedures not tolerated
in civil litigation.
CIVIL USE OF GRAND JURY SECRETS
The argument that the broad power of the grand jury should not be used
to benefit a civil case overlooks the fact that grand jury materials are
regularly made available for the government's civil use pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). The evidence assembled by a grand jury
frequently contains material that would be highly beneficial to the govern-
ment in civil proceedings brought by the SEC, or the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice. Not surprisingly, neither Congress nor the courts
are inclined to say that information so well calculated to aid the agency
in carrying out its statutory functions should remain forever beyond the
pale. Nor is there substantial sentiment favoring the proposition that the
2 See text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
1979] 1053
1054 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI
prosecutor and grand jury must operate in a vacuum devoid of the investi-
gative and analytical assistance of the agency charged with enforcing stat-
utes regulating the conduct under investigation. Accordingly, in 1977 Con-
gress amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which had pre-
viously permitted disclosure of grand jury information only to "attorneys
for the government." Whereas that phrase has been defined to exclude
agency personnel," the amendment permits disclosure both to "an attor-
ney for the government" and "to such governmental personnel as are
deemed necessary by an attorney for the government in the performance
of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law."
The Senate Report on the amendment makes clear that its purpose is
to enable federal prosecutors in grand jury proceedings to benefit from the
expertise of agency personnel.26 Noting that federal crimes are investigated
and evaluated by agency personnel, the Senate found "no reason for a
barrier of secrecy to exist between the facets of the criminal justice system
upon which we all depend to enforce the criminal laws." 2'
The SEC or IRS personnel to whom grand jury information is disclosed
are unlikely to forget such information when they return to their civil
duties. Indeed, the Senate Report explicitly states that there is "no intent
to preclude the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforce-
ment purposes." ' Such use is authorized, in effect, by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(C)(i) which permits disclosure of matters occur-
ring before the grand jury "when so directed by a court preliminary to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding." One court of appeals has aptly
characterized the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) as congressional authori-
zation of "judicially supervised discovery of grand jury materials to govern-
ment agency personnel for civil law enforcement purposes." 9
24 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); FED. R. CaM. P. 54(c) (defining "Attorney
for the government" as the attorney general and his authorized assistant, a United States
attorney and his authorized assistant and in some circumstances the Attorney General or
other authorized officer of Guam).
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (as amended, Act of July 30, 1977, P.L. No. 95-78, §§ 1, 2(a), 91
Stat. 319, eff. Oct. 1, 1977); see Act of July 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-349, 90 Stat. 822 (1976).
28 S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 527, 530.
2 [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. Naws 527, 530.
' Id. at 532.
2 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir.
1978). See also United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Grand
Jury Investigation 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (SEC denied access to grand jury materi-
als for use in civil proceeding on ground that agency failed to show a particularized need for
the materials); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 934 (D.
Mass. 1975) ("The U.S. Attorney may not permit his assistants to use grand jury material in
connection with this civil case while the grand jury is conducting its investigation"). For an
analysis of Rule 6(e) applications after the 1977 amendments to the rule, see In re 1974 Term
Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978) (disclosure of grand jury material
to IRS permitted if grand jury was legitimately for criminal investigation).
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The exceptions to Rule 6(e)'s mandate of grand jury secrecy have suffi-
cient breadth to swallow the rule of secrecy and make a hollow platitude
of the principle that the powerful grand jury subpoena may not properly
be used for civil law enforcement purposes. The traditionally recognized
sop to the principle of non-use of the grand jury to aid a civil investigation
has been the dictum in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.3" that the
government's use of "criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case
. . . would [flout] the policy of the law. ' '3 1 By suggesting a test in terms
of the government's purpose in invoking the grand jury's process, the Court
implicitly sanctioned incidental benefits to a civil case from an investiga-
tion commenced for a criminal purpose, and left open the question of the
propriety of initiating a grand jury investigation for combined criminal and
civil purposes.
32
In a carefully considered opinion in United States v. Doe,33 Judge Fran-
kel sought to close the door on the dual purpose grand jury, holding "that
the grand jury's role is properly confined, and amply respected, when it is
held empowered to conduct investigations that are in their inception exclu-
sively criminal."3' Of course, as Judge Frankel recognized, even this formu-
lation would permit eventual use in civil cases of information developed
by a grand jury that was at its inception exclusively criminal in purpose.
Moreover, recent decisions have sanctioned grand jury investigations that
plainly had both civil and criminal purposes. Such combined purposes are
apparent in the case of In re April, 25 1978 Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum. 31 There, IRS agents were investigating an electric supply company
and its principal officers in connection with alleged irregularities in the
company's corporate income tax return for 1973. Evidence indicated possi-
ble criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code. When the agents
encountered what they regarded as a lack of cooperation by the targets of
the investigation, the IRS Regional Counsel recommended to the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division
that a grand jury investigation be conducted to provide evidence
of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7201
. . . with a view toward the return of indictments against Gerald
Gruberg and Jacob Gruberg for attempting to evade and defeat the
corporate income tax liabilities of [their company] for the year
1973.31
356 U.S. 677 (1958).
31 Id. at 683.
31 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Procter & Gamble, read the majority opinion to preclude
only a grand jury investigation "instituted solely in aid of a civil suit - that is without any
thought of obtaining an indictment." Id. at 689 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
3' Id. at 1352 (emphasis in original).
Id.; see In re 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978).
453 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 1228.
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The Regional Counsel also requested that any data the grand jury gener-
ated be submitted to the IRS at the conclusion of the grand jury proceed-
ing, and subsequent to a Rule 6(e) order. Along with "other information,"
the grand jury materials would then be 'process[ed] through the normal
service channels.' 8 In seeking the institution of a grand jury investigation
for combined civil and criminal purposes, the IRS apparently was seeking
the "open-ended grand jury inquiry" that the Internal Revenue Manual
had condoned for circumstances in which IRS investigations were ineffec-
tual. 9
The letter request of the IRS for a grand jury investigation had made
explicit the grand jury's combined civil and criminal purposes. One of the
targets of the investigation moved for an order quashing a subpoena and
terminating the grand jury investigation. Although Judge Frankel's opin-
ion in the Doe case appears to have called for the grant of the motion on
the basis that the grand jury was not "at its inception exclusively crimi-
nal," Judge Haight denied the motion. He distinguished Doe from the case
before him on the ground that, in the latter case, there was "no explicit
statement that the grand jury investigation is intended, from its inception,
to assist IRS in the development of a civil tax case."4
In view of the explicit statements by the IRS of such combined purpose,
Judge Haight seemed to fashion a rule that gives exclusive weight to the
avowed purpose of the prosecutor, and ignores entirely the purpose of the
administrative agency. Given the fact that the prosecutor and the IRS
employees are agents of a single government, there is little merit in this
distinction.
Nonetheless, this same approach was applied with a vengeance in a
recent Fourth Circuit case4 scrutinizing a grand jury investigation. The
grand jury commenced at or about the time the taxpayer had successfully
resisted judicial enforcement of several IRS administrative summonses.2
Five IRS agents who had been involved in the administrative investigation
were assigned to assist the grand jury. 3 The grand jury subpoenas sought
3X Id.
11 At the time United States v. Doe was decided, the Internal Revenue Manual provided,
in part, that when
investigations into areas of noncomplaince are stymied by a series of reluctant
witnesses, and it is not possible to determine the precise limits of the tax violations
in terms of defendants and taxable periods ... and it appears that an open-ended
grand jury inquiry would probably develop information which would result in prose-
cution recommendation(s), the special agent should submit a complete report to
the Chief ....
Internal Revenue Manual § 9267.4(1) (withdrawn Nov. 21, 1977), quoted in In re Gruberg,
453 F. Supp. 1225, 1229 n.7.
453 F. Supp. at 1232.
" In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978).
,2 Id. at 1106. The grand jury was not commenced until after the IRS had decided to
discontinue its own criminal investigation into the target's tax returns for 1971-1975. Id. at
105-06.
11 Id. at 1106. One of the IRS agents assigned to assist the grand jury had been connected
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the same material the IRS previously had tried unsuccessfully to obtain.
The Court of Appeals denied the taxpayer's petition for a writ of man-
damus that would have directed the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the allegation that the government had abused the grand jury
process. The court agreed with the district court that an affidavit of one
of the Justice Department attorneys conducting the investigation, which
stated that the government was using the grand jury in good faith, was
sufficient to meet the taxpayer's allegations." As in the Gruberg case, the
court ignored any possible motivation of the IRS for prompting the grand
jury investigation. The issue as to the proper bounds of the interrela-
tionship between two arms of the government was resolved by ignoring one
of the arms.
Both decisions probably are best understood in terms of the extreme
judicial reluctance to intrude on the conduct of an on-going grand jury
investigation.45 For present purposes, it is enough to recognize that the
"intrusive" powers of the grand jury are frequently used with the effect of
benefiting civil cases, either because such effect is the incidental result of
a purely criminal inquiry, or because the grand jury is accepted as a legiti-
mate means for initiating a "combined purpose" inquiry. Any rationale for
the proper relationship between parallel civil and criminal investigations
that is based upon an assumed "barrier of secrecy" between the two is not
dealing with reality.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that all Justice Department
attorneys are "attorneys for the government" within Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 6 and 54, and that, therefore, all Justice Department
attorneys may routinely have access to grand jury information, without
court order, for the express purpose of using it in a civil case.4" The tradi-
tional secrecy justifications for structuring the relationship between paral-
lel investigations no longer prevent disclosure of grand jury materials to
administrative civil investigators. Clearly then, the rule of grand jury se-
crecy is frequently nothing more than a justification for perpetuating the
advantage obtained by the government's use of the grand jury to conduct
ex parte discovery proceedings. However, none of the usual reasons for the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings legitimately supports a refusal to give the
defendant access to transcripts of such proceedings after the grand jury has
completed its deliberations.
with prior civil audits of the target in addition to the administrative criminal investigation.
Id.
4 Id. at 1108. The Department of Justice attorneys had sworn that "[tihe grand jury is
engaged solely in the investigation of criminal matters and is not gathering evidence for the
purpose of using such evidence in any ongoing or contemplated civil proceeding of any kind
whatever." Id. at 1106 n.5.
11 Judicial reluctance to play an active role in on-going grand jury proceedings stems
from the perception of the grand jury as an institution unattached to either the executive or
legislative branches of the federal government. See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306,
1312-13 (9th Cir. 1977).
" In re Grand Jury, Miscellaneous No. 979, 583 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The five traditional reasons for the policy of secrecy are:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in
its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission
of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated
from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation,
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no proba-
bility of guilt.47
The first two reasons have no application at all after the grand jury has
already returned an indictment; the same is true of the fifth. As to the
third reason, any grand jury witnesses scheduled to testify at trial already
will have testified to the grand jury by the time the secrecy rules are
invoked, and will ultimately be identified at trial. The third reason for
grand jury secrecy thus boils down to little more than a desire to keep
secret the identity of the government's witnesses. The fourth reason is a
wholly unworthy one. Any witness who is to be of any use in the case must
be willing to testify publicly at trial. There is no justification for giving any
special protection to a malicious informant who would bring about an
indictment through secret testimony but be unwilling to assist in proving
the allegations of the indictment at trial.
Nonetheless, the defendant has no right of access to grand jury min-
utes, and can obtain them only upon a showing of "a particularized
need."48 Given the fact that the government has full access to the minutes
of the grand jury, there appears to be no legitimate justification for keeping
the defendant in the dark. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[in our adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely
justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of
relevant fact."49 There is no reason, then, why the defendant should not
be entitled to a transcript of the grand jury proceedings.
7 United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958).
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959). Not only is a
defendant's right to grand jury minutes contingent upon a particularized need, but that need
must also be weighed against the policy of grand jury secrecy. Id. at 400, 403 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court rejected the Pittsburgh Plate defendants' claim that a right to grand
jury transcripts arose when the grand jury investigation addressed the general issues covered
at a subsequent trial. Id. at 400.
11 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966). In Dennis, the court affirmed the
defendant's right to have access to a transcript of the prosecution's trial witnesses' grand jury
testimony while the witnesses are available for cross-examination upon a showing of
"particularized need" for the testimony and where the importance of maintaining grand jury
secrecy is "minimal" Id. at 868-75.
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THE UNFAIRNESS OF Ex PARTE DIsCovERY
Analysis of the civil and criminal subpoena in terms of their differing
effect on a witness overlooks the important fact, common to both civil and
criminal investigations, that the potential defendant is not given an oppor-
tunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who are making the
case against him in the parallel investigation. It is difficult to overstate the
advantage given to one party to a dispute when that party is empowered
to issue compulsory process to require testimony under oath outside the
presence of the other party. The Anglo-American legal system rests upon
the proposition tht cross-examination "is beyond doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."5 It is just this vehicle that
is studiously excluded from both the administrative investigation and the
grand jury inquiry.
The traditional justification for not extending cross-examination rights
to investigative hearings, even those investigative hearings conducted on
the record and under oath, has been that "the investigative process could
be completely disrupted if investigative hearings were transformed into
trial-like proceedings."'" The constitutional struggle over the circumstan-
ces in which due process requires the right of cross-examination has been
fought largely in terms of whether the result of a particular proceeding may
be said to be "an adjudication." Although due process requires that a
defendant in a criminal" or civil5 3 case be accorded the right of cross-
examination, denial of this right during a grand jury or administrative
investigation has been justified on the ground that such "general fact-
finding" proceedings are "non-adjudicative." 54 A sound argument can be
" 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The value of cross-examination
stems from the fact that it "permits disclosure of contradictions, inconsistencies, unsupported
conclusions, bizarre descriptions of events, favoritism in testimony, motive, bias, slanting of
facts, absence of proof, and in some cases even perjury." Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 n.5 (1978) (quoting WERCHICK, CALIFORNIA
PREPARATION AND TRIAL 727 (2d ed. 1974)).
11 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 443 (1960).
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264-67 (1948) (conviction for contempt of court invalid when
accused not afforded a "public" hearing, even though alleged contempt occurred in connec-
tion with special secret judicial investigation).
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
" Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445-49 (1960). The Hannah Court held that three
factors must be considered to determine whether certain rights are constitutionally guaran-
teed in a particular proceeding. In addition to the nature of the proceeding as adjudicative
or investigative, the Court assessed the "nature of the alleged right involved, . . . and the
possible burden on [the] proceeding . . - " Id. at 442. Hannah involved the validity of
procedural rules prescribed by an Executive Commission on Civil Rights for the conduct of
its investigations. The Court held that the rules, which denied witnesses at the Commission's
hearings the rights of cross examination to confront their accusers, and to be apprised of any
specific charges that are being investigated, id. at 441-42, did not violate the requirements of
due process. Id. at 451. In discussing the nature of the Commission's hearings as non-
adjudicative, the Court noted that the Commission did not "hold trials or determine ...
liability ... issue orders . . .. indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It [didl not
make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property." Id. at 441.
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made that the significance of the determination to indict mandates that,
if compulsory process is to be used by the government in connection with
that decision, the potential defendant should be allowed a reciprocal right
of cross-examination and the correlative right to use compulsory process
to present his own case.15
An outline of such an argument is set forth in Justice Douglas's concur-
ring opinion in Donaldson v. United States. 6 The Court affirmed the de-
nial of a taxpayer's motion to intervene in a proceeding to enforce an IRS
summons directed to a third party witness. Justice Douglas agreed that the
taxpayer could not prevent the summons from issuing. Nevertheless he
argued that the taxpayer would have a right to be present at the proceed-
ings conducted pursuant to the IRS summons and "to confront and cross-
examine witnesses and inspect evidence against him. '57 Justice Douglas
based this conclusion on the ground that the IRS clearly had begun a
criminal investigation of the taxpayer. He espoused the view that when
a determination to bring criminal charges is made in a proceeding other
than the constitutionally sanctioned grand jury, "such a proceeding may
not be held without affording the taxpayer an opportunity to attend, to
cross-examine, and to rebut."59 This argument has not found favor with the
Court. The expedient argument against disruption has prevailed, its vic-
tory expressed in the conclusion that the investigative process is not an
adjudication."0
However, the traditional analysis in terms of the nature of the determi-
nation ignores the entirely separate question of the harm done to the poten-
tial defendant, not by the decision to proceed further against him, but by
the ex parte use of compulsory process to build the case that will ultimately
be presented at the further proceedings. At trial, be it civil or criminal, the
defendant will have the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. Yet
the witnesses to be cross-examined already will have committed them-
selves to a given version of events in the course of sworn, recorded testi-
mony before a grand jury or administrative investigator outside the pres-
ence of the defendant.
See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 538.
' Id. at 531.
' Id. at 541. Justice Douglas distinguished between the rghts of targets of administrative
investigations and grand jury proceedings. In the grand jury context, there is no right to
counsel or confrontation, but the presence of the grand jurors serves to protect against govern-
mental officials abusing witnesses or subsequently misrepresenting their testimony. Id. at
538-39 (quoting In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346-47 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting)). Although
Justice Douglas's view was influenced by the criminal nature of the IRS investigation, see
text accompanying note 58 supra, he indicated that his resolution of the issues would not be
altered by the fact that an investigation had criminal and civil aspects. 400 U.S. at 537 n.1.
In either case, the administrative investigation would be used as an accusatorial arm of the
federal government, requiring procedural due process safeguards. Id. at 540 (quoting Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 499 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
10 See note 54 supra.
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Experience teaches that the leading questions that abound in ex parte
examination can suggest their own answers which, once given, are later
adhered to as the true version of events that have since faded into oblivion.
The importance of the power to conduct such ex parte examination is
particularly great where the alleged offense involves complex economic
activity. In such cases, there is usually little doubt as to what took place.
The critical questions concern subtle shadings in the meaning of ambigu-
ous conversations, fine distinctions as to the time at which knowledge of
significant facts was acquired, and the higher abstractions of the intent
that motivated particular conduct. These kinds of issues are particularly
susceptible to the abuse of leading questions tilted toward a predisposed
view of events.
Testimony elicted at such ex parte proceedings can determine the out-
come of a subsequent trial that appears to comport with due process. A
trial witness who has previously committed himself to a particular version
of events probably will be given the opportunity to review a transcript of
his testimony prior to trial. This "review" merely increases the likelihood
that the witness will abide by his first recitation of events elicted by the
helpful ex parte examination of the prosecutor or agency attorney. If his
subsequent testimony departs from the earlier version, the prior testimony
nonetheless makes highly effective cross-examination material, either for
impeachment purposes or admission into evidence as a prior inconsistent
statement." Moreover, if the witness is an alleged "co-conspirator," por-
tions of his prior testimony may be admissible as part of the government's
case in chief under the rubric of admissions of the defendant.2 Despite
ostensible adherence to due process at trial, the defendant can be con-
victed as a result of testimony elicited at earlier proceedings from which
he was excluded.
In Coleman v. Alabama, 3 the Supreme Court recognized the fact that
the government's ex parte examination of witnesses can affect the fairness
of a subsequent trial. In holding that a defendant is entitled to counsel at
a preliminary hearing, the Court listed ways in which "the guiding hand
of counsel" at the preliminary hearing is essential:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in
any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced
lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testi-
11 See IFED. R. EVID. 613 (method of examining witness regarding prior inconsistent state-
ments, and use of extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement), 801(d)(1)(A) (prior
statement of trial witness not hearsay if he is subject to cross examination and statement was
given under oath subject to .penalty for perjury).
62 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
' 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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mony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear
at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover
the case the State has against his client and make possible the
preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. 4
The court's second and third examples illustrate the way in which exclu-
sion of counsel from proceedings at which the government can compel
testimony detracts from the fairness of a subsequent trial. Both an under-
standing of the state's case, and preparation for future testimony
"materially affect an accused's ability to present an effective defense at
trial. '" - Neither prerequisite for an effective defense is possible when the
state has the advantage of what is, in effect, ex parte discovery.
The clearest judicial recognition of the continuing harm inflicted on a
defendant as a result of the government's power to develop an ex parte
record is found in the decision of the California Supreme Court in Hawkins
v. Superior Court.6" In California, a felony prosecution may be initiated
either by the prosecutor filing an information or by the grand jury return-
ing an indictment. The defendant accused by information is entitled to a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate and may be represented by coun-
sel who has the right to cross-examine hostile witnesses and present excul-
patory evidence. 7 Although a defendant charged by indictment is entitled
to judicial review of the grand jury's probable cause determination, he has
no right to confront and cross examine witnesses or object to evidence prior
to trial."8
The Hawkins court held that persons prosecuted by indictment and
thus deprived of the preliminary hearing and its concomitant rights, are
11 Id. at 9. In Coleman, the Court held that the preliminary hearing in Alabama was a
"critical stage" in the prosecution of the defendant. Id. at 9-10. The Court stated that
characterizing a proceeding as a critical stage depends on 'whether potential substantial
prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice.' Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
11 See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 282 (1972). In Adams, the Court refused to apply
its holding in Coleman v. Alabama, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), retroactively. 405 U.S. at 284-85.
One factor the Court examined was the impact that the right to counsel at a preliminary
hearing would have on the "integrity of the factfinding process." Id. at 281-82. The Court
held that the presence of counsel at the hearing would not significantly contribute to the fact
finding process because the limited utility of the hearing for impeachment or discovery
purposes rendered the presence of counsel less significant to the accused's presentation of an
effective defense. Id. at 282.
The Adams Court's analysis, however, begs the question in the context of parallel investi-
gations. The basic unfairness of parallel investigations stems from the fact that they may be
used by the government to develop a criminal case against the target of an administrative
investigation, outside the confines of the grand jury process. The argument that counsel is
less necessary in an administrative hearing because such a proceeding presents fewer oppor-
tunities for discovery and gathering impeachment evidence ignores the fact that the govern-
ment may be using the hearing precisely for those purposes.
22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
'7 Id. at 587, 586 P.2d at 917-18, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37.
Id. at 587-88, 586 P.2d at 918, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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denied equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the California
Constitution. 9 Viewing the indicted defendant's right to challenge the
existence of probable cause based upon a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings as an inadequate substitute for the right to confront and cross-
examine prosecution witnesses, the court said "[s]uch a transcript will
invariably reflect only what the prosecuting attorney permits it to reflect;
it is certainly no substitute for the possibility of developing further evi-
dence through a probing cross-examination of prosecution witnesses - a
possibility foreclosed with the denial of an adversarial proceeding."70 The
court perceived the harm done to the potential defendant through the ex
parte development of an evidentiary record to be that "the defense has no
opportunity to conduct the searching cross-examination necessary to re-
veal flaws in the testimony of prosecution witnesses or to expose dubious
eye witness identification."'
Transcripts of the SEC private investigation into the acquisition of the
assets of Air West, Inc. illustrate the Hawkins court's fears in the context
of parallel Federal investigations. Specifically, the transcripts portray the
virtually unlimited power of the questioner to suggest answers to the wit-
ness during ex parte examination. One of the witnesses examined had been
a member of the faction of the Air West board that opposed the then
proposed sale of the company's assets, and sought to delay a stockholder
vote on the sale. He testified that his faction hired a Washington law firm
to approach the SEC with respect to the proxy statement to aid the group
in "doing everything we could to impede the progress of getting this thing
[proxy statement] out, or getting as many changes in it as we could that
would help us at some point."72 Such efforts by the so-called dissident
directors were important to the potential defendants. The SEC examiner,
proceeding ex parte, followed up this way:
Q. Without putting words in your mouth, may I say then that
when you say "help us," you meant yourself along with the other
directors, and you also meant to help the stockholders you
represented?
A. That's right ....
Q. Was this also the function of the law firm ... to attempt to
change the Proxy [sic] in an attempt to make the information in
it more objective so the stockholders [sic] could form a more
adequate conclusion on the basis of the offer?
A. I believe that that's what they were to do . . .
Another witness testified that he had resisted being discharged from the
" Id. at 592-93, 586 P.2d at 921-22, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41.
7' Id. at 589, 586 P.2d at 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
7' Id. at 591, 586 P.2d at 920-21, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40 (footnote omitted).
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employ of one of the targets of the investigation by telling his employer
that "when I am threatened, I get a little mean."7 The SEC examiner,
ardent for the pursuit of truth, clarified by asking, "[w]hen you say
'mean,' you mean you may tell the truth about something that would hurt
someone else?"
7 5
To be sure, these are extreme examples. They are, however, by no
means unique, or even rare. Rather, they are the inevitable result of the
temptation presented when the examining party with a particular target
in mind is given ex parte power of subpoena. These excesses would not
occur at a trial or in civil pretrial discovery where the presence of opposing
counsel and the right of cross-examination would prevent them. They
flourish in the ex parte investigation. Any analysis of such investigations
must take into account the enormous potential for unfairness that resides
in the power to subpoena witnesses to an ex parte examination. Admit-
tedly, the expediency argument of Hannah v. Larche may justify tolerating
this unfairness at the initial stages of an investigation where a broad lati-
tude of inquiry into a generalized subject matter is properly the rule.
Nevertheless, once the government focuses its investigation on particular
violations by identified individuals, fundamental fairness requires that
those individuals be given a right of cross-examination at any proceeding
in which the government uses compulsory process to develop evidence to
prove the charges.
The distinction between a generalized investigation for the purpose of
framing a charge and a proceeding to develop evidence to prove particular
charges against identified individuals does no more than import the ration-
ale of Escobedo v. Illinois"6 into the context of a more formalized govern-
mental investigation into more sophisticated economic crime. In
Escobedo, the Court held that the right to counsel may not be delayed, as
the dissent argued, until the time of indictment, but must be accorded
when "the investigation has begun to focus on a particular suspect rather
than continue as a general inquiry into an unsolved crime.77
4 Id., Tr. of Paul Stoddard, (Oct. 18, 1973 at 9).
7 Id. Both Martin and Stoddart testified before the SEC as to facts they had learned
from the SEC examiner during off-the-record conversations with him. Id., Tr. of Paul Stod-
dard, (Dec. 11, 1973 at 28); Tr. of Joseph Martin, Jr., (Dec. 11, 1973 at 123). This fact is a
classic example of one of the abuses of ex parte witness examination outside the grand jury
that Justice Douglas referred to in his concurring opinion in Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517, 538-39 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 59 supra. Moreover, these abuses
are not necessarily restricted to administrative proceedings. They may also arise in the grand
jury context despite the protections inherent in the composition and procedures of the grand
jury. See note 59 supra. In United States v. Boberg, 565 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1977), the court
noted that the prosecutor's interrogation of the defendant as a grand jury witness consisted
"almost entirely of leading questions" and the defendant's "cryptic responses" thereto. Id.
at 1062-63. The court expressly recognized that "[this kind of interrogation always creates
the risk that the witness will misunderstand the questions or that the prosecutor will put
words in the witness' mouth." Id. at 1063.
76 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1 Id. at 490. In Escobedo, the petitioner had requested to see his attorney who was
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Determining the point at which an investigation into a complex eco-
nomic crime has focused on a "particular suspect" may not always be
simple.78 However, it is no more difficult than many other fact issues neces-
sary to the application of any legal principle. Standards for determining
when the right discussed herein becomes applicable are discussed below.
For the moment, it should be noted only that the right, being a right based
upon a power that is common both to grand juries and administrative
investigations, is one that applies without regard to whether the investiga-
tion is being conducted by an administrative agency or a grand jury.
EQUAL PRE-TRuAL DISCOvERY
The fact that the grand jury subpoena has "more intrusive" powers
than does the typical agency subpoena fails to provide a rationale for a
prohibition against exchanges between parallel civil and criminal investi-
gations because it fails to explain the prohibition against the use of the
"weaker" agency powers to benefit a criminal prosecution. An examination
of the basis for the prohibition against this "upstream" flow of information
points the way to a more comprehensive understanding of the proper rela-
tionship between parallel civil and criminal investigations.
In United States v. LaSalle National Bank,7" the Supreme Court held
that the IRS may not properly issue a summons after the IRS has recom-
mended a criminal prosecution relating to the subject matter of the sum-
mons. Under the traditional rationale, there would have been no objection
to such use of the weaker administrative powers to aid the stronger grand
jury. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that this "prophylactic
restraint" was necessary because of the "likelihood" that use of the IRS
summons after a criminal reference would "broaden the Justice Depart-
ment's right of criminal litigation discovery" or "infringe on the role of the
grand jury as a principal tool of criminal accusation."8
The concern for maintaining the primacy of the grand jury as an accu-
satorial body, however laudable in the abstract, is unrealistic in light of
the fact that the IRS and SEC already are empowered statutorily to initi-
ate the process of criminal accusation in their areas of responsibility.,'
Moreover, Congress and the courts have repeatedly recognized the desira-
bility, if not the necessity, of assigning agency personnel to assist prosecu-
tors and grand juries investigating complex economic crimes. 82 The con-
refused access to his client during a police interrogation. Id. at 481-82.
11 The Escobedo Court characterized the point at which the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of assistance of counsel adheres in general terms. The Court held that when a police
investigation "shifts from investigatory to accusatory - when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to illicit a confession - our adversary system beings to operate, and, under the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." Id. at 492.
437 U.S. 298 (1978).
'o Id. at 312.
01 See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
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cern that "criminal litigation discovery" not be broadened makes sense
only as applied to the use of an IRS summons after the return of an
indictment. After a criminal reference, but prior to indictment, the grand
jury's own subpoena power provides the broadest possible discovery.8
After an indictment has been returned the government's rights of pre-
trial discovery are severely circumscribed. Primarily, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure limit the prosecution's right to notice of an alibi or
mental condition defense,84 and its right to discovery of certain other items
unless the defendant obtains discovery of similar items from the govern-
ment.85 The government may not circumvent these limitations on discov-
ery in a criminal case by using a grand jury "for the sole or dominating
purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial.",8 This prin-
ciple is one application of the more fundamental proposition, discussed
above, that it is unfair to use compulsory process to develop a case against
a potential defendant at an ex parte hearing, once the potential defendant
and the charge have been identified. The point at which an indictment is
filed provides a clear line of demarcation, beyond which further use of
compulsory process to develop evidence ex parte for the purpose of proving
the charges already identified in the indictment is not permissible.
To the extent that LaSalle applies the same prohibition to use of
agency process after indictment, it is simply a logical application of exist-
ing principles. The court's holding in that case, however, is more far reach-
ing. It precludes the use of agency process in the period after the agency
recommends the institution of criminal proceedings, but before the return
of an indictment. However indirectly, the Supreme Court thus has re-
emphasized the unfairness of permitting the goverment to use compulsory
'3The government has at its disposal one of the most effective discovery mecha-
nisms yet devised - the grand jury. This body may call witnesses under compulsory
process and examine them in secret under oath, unhampered by the rules of evi-
dence or an adversary counsel's cross-examination, or in the case of a 'prospective
defendant' by Fifth Amendment immunity.
8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 16.08[1] (2d ed. Sept. 1979 rev.) (footnotes omitted).
M FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2. Rule 12.1(a) requires a defendant to give notice, upon the
attorney for the government's demand, of his intention to assert a defense of alibi. The
attorney for the government, however, must give notice to the defendant or his attorney of
the names and addresses of any witnesses the government will rely on to establish the defen-
dant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense and to rebut the testimony of the defen-
dant's alibi witnesses.
Under Rule 12.2, the defendant must give notice of his intention to rely on an insanity
defense and to introduce expert witnesses to testify as to his mental state.
The government's absolute right to discovery of documents, tangible objects, or exami-
nation and test reports in the defendant's possession adheres only if the defendant has
requested to inspect similar items that the government has. FED. R. CluM. P. 16(b). But see
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (prosecution may invoke the federal judici-
ary's inherent power to require production of witness statements that facilitate full disclosure
of all relevant facts).
11 United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 845 (1964);
see 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.08 (2d ed., Sept. 1979 rev.).
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process to obtain ex parte discovery after the responsible government
agency has sufficiently identified the violation and the violator to permit
it to make a criminal reference.
The agency's recommendation that criminal proceedings be brought is
a significant and objective milestone. It is a line of demarcation at which
the government officially frames charges against identified individuals."
Further development of the case through compulsory process after such
identification is properly stamped as the development of evidence to prove
such charges at trial. Permitting the government to use compulsory process
for this purpose circumvents the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
decision in LaSalle rightly prohibits the use of agency process after a
criminal reference.
Significantly, the Court also warns:
We shall not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation
to the Justice Department when there is an institutional commit-
ment to make the referral and the Service merely would like to
gather additional evidence for the prosecution. Such a delay would
be tantamount to the use of the summons authority after the rec-
ommendation and would permit the government to expand its
criminal discovery rights.m
The quoted passage is potentially very significant for two reasons. First, it
makes clear that courts must be prepared to determine when an adminis-
trative investigation has strayed beyond generalized fact gathering and
become a process of developing evidence to prove a case. Second, it implic-
itly authorizes the discovery that a defendant will need in order to show
that'an investigation has exceeded its proper bounds. Circuit courts
construing LaSalle indicate that discovery will be permitted upon a pre-
liminary showing of an unexplained delay of a tax investigation coupled
with communications between the IRS agents and the FBI or other Justice
Department representatives. 9 To make the showing of delay referred to in
"I Courts recognize the SEC's distinction between formal and informal references and the
fact that informal investigative materials may be disclosed to the United States Attorney
without official authorization. See United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978). The
SEC recently has taken steps to blur the line separating the government's investigatory and
accusatory functions in the area of parallel administrative and criminal investigations. See
Securities Act Release No. 6111, (Aug. 23, 1979) reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FzD.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,191 (announcing SEC amendments to its regulations which, among
other things, permit SEC officials to "discuss non-public investigations with officials of other
governmental agencies and self-regulatory organizations."). See also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b)
(1979).
u 437 U.S. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
go See, e.g., United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 598 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979). Cf. United States v. Genser, 602 F.2d 69 (3d
Cir. 1979) (IRS "institutional commitment to recommend proscution" does not invalidate
IRS summons where summon had legitimate civil purpose); United States v. Chemical Bank,
593 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979) (validity of IRS summons upheld where recommendation of
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LaSalle, a defendant should have a right to examine through discovery a
full transcript of all of the testimony compelled by subpoena during the
agency investigation." Relevant agency personnel should be subject to
deposition if the transcript suggests a basis for believing that there may
have been impermissible delay.' Relief for a demonstrated misuse of the
agency investigatory powers should include suppression of the evidence it
generates.
2
The LaSalle Court's recognition of the unfairness of using the agency
investigation for pre-trial discovery leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the same one-sided discovery ought not be sanctioned in the guise of
a grand jury investigation. The harm to the defendant is the same in each
case. The potential defendant to a charge being considered by a grand jury
needs the same kind of effective cross-examination by his counsel as did
the accused at the preliminary hearing in Coleman v. Alabama.3 The First
Circuit recognizes that a grand jury ought not be "decoyed into serving
primarily as a discovery device for the government's trial preparation." In
United States v. Doe, 94 Daniel Ellsberg contended that the government was
using a grand jury sitting in the District of Massachusetts to gather evi-
dence for the trial on an indictment returned against Ellsberg in the Cen-
tral District of California. The First Circuit suggested that the California
court's in camera review of transcripts of the Massachusetts proceeding
might lead to a proscription against "the calling of a witness [at trial]
whose testimony in Boston appeared to have been elicited chiefly for its
contribution to the trial in California."95
The First Circuit's decision is significant because it evinces a judicial
willingness, however tentative, to apply to a grand jury the kind of analysis
developed by implication from LaSalle with respect to an administrative
prosecution not delayed, civil purpose exists, and IRS participation in Justice Department
coordinated "Task Force" does not alter civil character of IRS audit).
10 Materials subpoenaed of the SEC for its investigation were made available to the
defendants in a subsequent criminal proceeding stemming from that investigation in In re
Nat'l Student Mktg. Litigation, 11973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,609
(D.D.C. 1974). Clearly, preventing abuse of the ex parte power of subpoena requires that a
transcript be maintained of all testimony compelled by an agency or grand jury. There is
normally a transcript of testimony compelled during SEC private investigations. See 17
C.F.R. § 203.6 (1979). Testimony compelled by IRS summons is not always transcribed. See
5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 9353(5). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) was
amended, effective August 1, 1979, to require that all grand jury proceedings except the
jurors' deliberations and vote, be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording
device. 47 U.S.L.W. 4488 (May 1, 1979).
" See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 n.17 (1978).
92 United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1276 (1st Cir. 1972). See also In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978); In re J.R. Simplot Co., 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
$ 9146 (9th Cir. 1976), withdrawn as moot on other grounds, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9511 (9th
Cir. 1977).
13 399 U.S. 1 (1969); see text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
'1 United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Ist Cir. 1972).
95 Id.
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agency. A slightly less gingerly approach than the First Circuit adopted
would make grand jury transcripts available to the defendant as a matter
of right." More defendants then would have a basis for attempting to show
that the grand jury was used for pre-trial discovery.
Nevertheless, courts remain extremely reluctant to interfere with the
grand jury and, like the LaSalle Court, permit the grand jury to engage in
precisely the same discovery process denied to administrative agencies.
The traditional basis for permitting a grand jury to do what an agency may
not is the assertion that the grand jury consists of an independent body of
citizens who serve as a buffer between the citizen and a baseless accusa-
tion. Yet this traditional model has been shown to be a fiction,'7 particu-
larly in the case of complex economic crimes. The new rules governing the
exchange of information between a grand jury and agency investigators
actually are based upon the principle that there should be no barriers
between them. Moreover, practice under Rule 6(e) is designed to insure
that the lay grand jury's investigation of complex economic transactions
is assisted by the investigation and analysis of agency employees. Finally,
agencies frequently make the critical decision to press the government to
bring a criminal case. In these circumstances, there is simply no justifica-
tion for permitting the use of the grand jury as a vehicle to give the govern-
ment free rein to engage in discovery of evidence to prove the charges
already framed by the agency. Indeed, the fundamental unfairness to the
identified defendant of permitting the government to engage in such ex
parte discovery should preclude the use of such tactics.
Cross-examination in the grand jury room undoubtedly would be dis-
ruptive and time consuming. Multiple defendants could mean multiple
lawyers. Objections to questions or lines of inquiry would require judicial
resolution. Even accepting these contentions, however, do they justify per-
mitting the government under the present system to ask objectionable
questions, and denying the defendant the right of cross-examination? Mere
disruption or consumption of time are inadequate answers. The Supreme
Court has expressly rejected such considerations of expediency by accord-
ing the target of a criminal investigation the right to counsel even though
the target's exercise of his rights could impede the efficiency of the investi-
gation." Of course, the Escobedo Court dealt with the identified target of
an investigation. Similarly, the instant proposal of a right to cross-
examination is addressed to persons the government has identified as po-
tential defendants to specific charges. Since the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion in LaSalle that courts will determine the point at which an investiga-
tion crosses the line between generalized inquiry and proof of particular
" The nature of the government's advantage in grand jury proceedings demands nothing
less than permitting the target access to the government's discovery.
" See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584, 590, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 Cal. Rptr.
435, 438-39 (1978).
M Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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charges, there is no reason why that line should not be drawn to prevent
misuse of the grand jury "as a discovery device for the government's trial
preparation.""
The principles advanced herein are more conservative than they may
initially seem. For one thing, they fall short of adopting the increasingly
espoused proposal that the grand jury be abolished.' ° On the contrary, the
grand jury should continue to be available to the prosecutor. Moreover, the
foregoing proposals recognize the validity of ex parte testimony pursuant
to subpoena when the grand jury is truly involved in a generalized investi-
gation before the government identifies a charge against a particular defen-
dant. Finally, the prosecution retains the power to conduct as much inves-
tigation in secret as it wishes, so long as it does not resort to the use of
compulsory process. Once the government has identified the defendant,
and wishes to use compulsory process, the principles set forth herein de-
prive the government of no more than the opportunity of proving its case
behind the defendant's back.
The recent decision in SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc. ,o illustrates the
confusion that can be created by overlooking the fact that the real vice of
parallel investigations lies in the harm done to the potential defendant
when evidence to prove the charges against him is compelled by subpoena
at proceedings from which he is excluded. The court held that the SEC
could properly issue subpoenas to advance its investigation even though
criminal charges on the same matter were already pending against the
target of the SEC investigation. The court then went on, however, to hold
that "the SEC may not provide the Justice Department with the fruits of
its civil discovery gathered after the decision to prosecute.' ' °
The court advanced two reasons for failing to follow the rule of LaSalle.
First, the court said that the SEC and the Justice Department are not so
"inherently intertwined" as the IRS and the Justice Department. This
fanciful distinction ignores the fact that the SEC and the Justice Depart-
ment are arms of a single government that have common objectives in the
enforcement of the federal securities laws. The supposed barrier the court
purported to find between the SEC and the Justice Department was no
more than a justification for the fiction it was about to create by holding
that the SEC could not provide the fruits of its discovery to the Justice
Department. That barrier seems a fragile one, at best, since the fruits of
the SEC's investigation become available to the world as soon as the SEC
chooses to make them public.
The court's second ground for departing from LaSalle was the assertion
that, while there is little public prejudice from delaying a civil tax proceed-
" United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1276 (1st Cir. 1972).
100 See Campbell, Grand Jury Reform: Is it Possible?, 4 LITIGATION 5 (1978).
0, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,172 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
11 Id. at 96,476. Although not necessary to the result, the Dresser court appeared to
impose the limitation on providing the Justice Department with the information gathered by
subpoenas addressed to third parties, as well as to the target.
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ing until the conclusion of the criminal matter, there is a substantial public
interest in swiftly remedying securities law violations. This distinction
overlooks several facts. First, there is no need to halt the SEC investigation
in order to protect the target's legitimate interests. Moreover, there is no
public interest in any unnecessary delay since a needless proliferation of
separate proceedings with separate limitations on the use of the evidence
thereby obtained does nothing but create further litigation with respect to
these artificial limitations.
General Motors REVIsrrED
The foregoing analysis provides a background for understanding and
evaluating the General Motors case.'0 3 The Sixth Circuit en banc ulti-
mately reversed a panel decision to terminate an allegedly improper grand
jury investigation by holding that the order of the district court denying
the requested relief was not appealable. Nevertheless, the facts of the
much discussed General Motors case warrant particular attention both
because of the intrinsic importance of the point the court considered, and
because the concrete factual setting illustrates the practical interplay of
the various factors discussed above.
During the course of a regular audit of General Motors' tax returns, the
IRS questioned the accuracy of an inventory, undertaken by the company
at the IRS's request, of so-called "expense items," meaning production
materials, such as spare parts for machinery, that do not become a part of
the finished product. General Motors contended that IRS agents used
abusive tactics in dealing with its employees during visits to its plants to
test the accuracy of the inventory.' 4
The IRS stopped its regular audit and brought in Revenue Service
intelligence agents to determine whether General Motors employees had
falsified the inventory. After the company objected to certain IRS requests
for the production of documents, Meno Piliaris, an IRS regional staff attor-
ney, prepared a recommendation that a grand jury investigation be insti-
tuted. The recommendation, which was forwarded to the Department of
Justice by the Regional Counsel, stated that, at an appropriate time, the
IRS would seek an order authorizing disclosure to the Revenue Service of
the information developed by the grand jury. Piliaris participated in devel-
oping the IRS's plan for handling the General Motors matter in coordina-
tion with the grand jury proceedings.' 5 Mr. Piliaris was designated by the
Department of Justice as a Special Attorney for the United States empow-
ered to assist in conducting grand jury proceedings. ' The grand jury then
"' In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General Motors Corp. v. United States), 584
F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (vacating on rehearing en banc 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1978)).
' 573 F.2d at 938.
103 Id.
oI See 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1976) (authorizing the appointment of special Attorneys for
the United States).
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served subpoenas on the company and its employees.
General Motors moved for an order disqualifying Piliaris from partici-
pating in grand jury proceedings or scrutinizing grand jury materials. The
district court denied the motion, but certified its denial for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An administrative panel of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
7
Judge Weick wrote an opinion for the majority of the panel to which
the appeal was assigned, and cited Wood v. Georgia'08 for the traditional
principle that the grand jury serves as a buffer of citizens who act as
security against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions. The panel
majority held that Piliaris' interest in obtaining an indictment, evidenced
by his prior participation in the IRS investigation, was at odds with the
principles enunciated in Woods v. Georgia and tainted his connection with
the grand jury proceedings with the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the motion to disqualify and
remanded with instructions to terminate the grand jury investigation as
invalid. 0 '
On rehearing en banc the court of appeals held that the denial of the
motion to disqualify was not reviewable under section 1292(b) because the
proceedings below were not a "civil action" within the meaning of that
statute.' Judge Weick filed a heated dissent, calling the matter "one of
the most important cases ever to be presented to an appellate court for
review," and reiterating his view that Mr. Piliaris was disqualified by
reason of a conflict of interest.
Finding a conflict of interest might have made sense if Mr. Piliaris had
been assigned to serve as a grand juror with at last a theoretical duty to
act as a citizen buffer against a zealous prosecutor. Yet Mr. Piliaris was
appointed to be a prosecutor, not a grand juror; an attorney presenting the
government's case, and not a judge of it. His client was the United States,
as it was when he recommended on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service
that the grand jury proceedings be instituted. As noted above, a realistic
analysis must take into account the fact that employees of an administra-
tive agency and prosecutors are all agents of the United States. Judge
Meritt's dissent from the panel decision aptly observed that "[tihere is
no conflict of interest between the Department of Justice and the Internal
07 The administrative panel's action was necessary because a notice of appeal from a
final order had been dismissed.
103 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
10 Judge Merrit dissented in the General Motors case, believing that no conflict of
interest arose when an administrative agent participates in a criminal investigation stemming
from his prior work. 573 F.2d at 945-49.
"0 In addition to asserting that the denial of the motion to disqualify was reviewable
under 18 U.S.C. § 1292(b), petitioner in General Motors had sought mandamus to disqualify
Piliaris on the basis of conflict of interest. Judges Edwards and Lively, concurring in the
court's en banc judgment, also noted that mandamus was inappropriate since there existed
no conflict of interest. See 573 F.2d at 947 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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Revenue Service.""' Mr. Piliaris had no greater conflict than any prosecu-
tor who participates in grand jury proceedings he instituted, or who tries
a case that he presented to a grand jury.
The disqualification theory is an unsound basis for quarreling with the
use of agency employees to assist the grand jury."2 None of the many
opinions in General Motors considered whether the real vice in the conduct
of grand jury proceedings with the aid of agency personnel is not the
presence of the agency personnel but the exclusion of the defendant. Once
the agency develops its case sufficiently to permit a bona fide criminal
reference, the proceedings of the grand jury should be presumptively re-
garded as discovery designed to gather proof."' The harm to the defendant
is not that the discovery process is aided by the agency. Agencies often
perform that assistance function, pursuant to statutory and administrative
authority."' What harms the defendant is the conduct, in his absence, of
a mini-trial of the agency recommendation. It is submitted that, for the
reasons stated herein, such harm constitutes a denial of due process of law.
CONCLUSION
The basis for the traditional objection to exchanges of information be-
tween parallel civil and criminal investigations of the same conduct is an
assumption that knowledge possessed by one part of the government
should be kept secret from another part. Congress and the courts have been
unwilling to adhere to that assumption in the case of complex economic
crimes that are often investigated by agency personnel with particular
expertise in the area under investigation. In these circumstances, Congress
and the courts have permitted a broad latitude of interchange of informa-
tion between the grand jury and agency investigations. There is nothing
inherently improper in such exchanges.
What has been overlooked, however, is that investigations into complex
economic conduct have themselves become more complex. These extended
investigations have strayed beyond the mere formulation of a charge
against the defendant and become, in effect, pre-trial discovery of evidence
' 573 F.2d at 947.
22 A number of courts recently have held that the use of agency personnel to assist a
grand jury cannot be attacked on a disqualification theory. See United States v. Wencke, No.
78-2346 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1979), United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979); In
re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), appeals docketed, No. 79-1360 (9th Cir. May 25, 1979), No. 79-1399 (9th Cir. June
12, 1979).
"' An agency's bad faith recommendation that criminal proceedings be instituted raises
serious issues of vindictive or retaliatory prosecution. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974). In Blackledge the authorities charged a criminal defendant with a more serious of-
fense, after the accused had exercised his right to request a trial de novo in a court of general
jurisdiction following a misdemeanor conviction. The Court held the official practice uncon-
stitutional, noting that the opportunity presented for official vindictiveness might deter a
defendant from exercising his rights.
11 See text accompanying notes 24-46 supra.
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to prove those charges. According to the argument developed herein, due
process of law requires that once the defendant has been indentified, he
be permitted to participate in further proceedings at which compulsory
process is used to develop evidence against him.
This principle is the same whether the proceeding at issue is the tradi-
tional grand jury investigation of violent crime or a set of parallel adminis-
trative and grand jury investigations into a complex economic crime. How-
ever, since it appears likely that the misuse of ex parte subpoena power is
more aggravated in the case of investigations into complex economic
crimes, and since the record created by those investigations provides a
clearer basis for demonstrating the abuse, judicial decisions in this general
area are more likely to arise in the context of a parallel investigation of
economic crime. Rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court's decision in
LaSalle suggests that the Court will be more sympathetic to limitations
on the use of any agency's subpoena power than to limitations on the
subpoena power of the grand jury. Failure to alleviate the unfairness de-
scribed in this article is likely to weaken the ability of the grand jury to
survive a period of increasing attacks on its procedures.
